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Early In August 1983, tha urban 1ncand1ar1•• Hhlch had baan sweeping much of
South Africa for s o u 18 Months aruptad In Durban, Just at a time whan local
raaaarchara and othar lntaraatad obaarvara Hara trying to undaratand why Natal
»•• ao 'qulst'. Oaaplta Much avidanca of regionally generatad conflict in that
province, tha Hldaapraad ant 1-government raaiatanca Hltnaaaad in tha Transvaal
and Capa had not aantfastad Itself to anything Ilkt tha I U I dagraa In Natal.
Whan It did break out, sparked by tha assassination of Victoria Mxenge outalda
har Umlazi hoaa on tha 1st August, (1) aany were surprised both by its
auddannaas and lntanaity. Within a Meek, hardly a shop or government building
in African araas of tha city Has nora than burnad-out shall.
Inanda was caught in this upsurge In a way fata in tha democratic movement could
review with anything but regret: avanta thara seemed to culminate in a
confrontation batHaan Indian and African paopla. Tha nadla Hara quick to raisa
tha spectre of tha 1949 'net claahaa' In Durban, whlla many danlad any racial
friction what a var, claiailng that to adult such would ba to play into tha handa
of govarnaant-confactad policias and propaganda. Claarly, tha iasua of raca
within tha ranka of tha oppraaaad claaaaa was a aanaitiva ona. Tha naln theme
of this papar, than, must ba tha "complexities and ambiguities* arising from tha
"profound racial dimension" (2) of class conflict In Inanda up to and in 198S.
In Inanda, no laas than in any othar unanfranchlaad and aconoMically daprlvad
araa of South Africa, thara Mara local cauaas anough to thraatan instability
and a braakdottn In tha social order. It la doubtful whether tha onaat of
violence, finally, would hava baan so intense or Hidaapraad without tha stimulus
of ravivad political activity in tha country ovar tha past few yearsI tha point
reaaina, however, that tha underlying cauaas, couraa and outcome of violence
auat ba aought In Inanda's particular, local hlatory. Slnca thla papar Is
concerned with tha immediate past, tha graatar part of Inanda'a developaent can
ba dealt with only vry briafly. Emphasis la necessarily laid on tha pariod
froa tha 1960a onwards, whan Inanda bacaae rapidly incorporatad into
metropolitan Durban aa an 'informal' ahanty town.
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A brief hlmtory to the 1960s
The M M 'Inanda' applies to several areas or places, Mhos* boundaries sometimes
but not always overlap. It was originally given to far*) of the Natalia Republic
period. In 1647, tha African location to tha north Mast of Durban Mas gazetted
as tha Inanda Location (it sharad a bordar Mlth th* far* Inanda), and tha
atratch of colony batman tha location and tha aaa - some ISO aquara miles - Mas
knoMn as tha Inanda Division of Victoria County, a coastal strip Mhich Mas to
become tha cantra of Natal'a sugar industry. 'Inanda' Mas also tha name given
by Oanial Llndlay to his Mission reserve, at tha south aastarn edge of tha
location, whan ha moved thara in 1837. Nowadays, it is tha officially
designated 'Ralaasad Araa 33' which is •o«t commonly cat lad Inanda. For tha
most part, it consists of prlvataly ownad land in tha Inanda Division adjoining
tha aastarn slda of tha old mission reserve (now incorporatad into KwaZulu), and
is tha placa which Is tha subJact of this papar. (3)
In tha 19th cantury, only thraa farms, or parts of farms, covarad tha araa which
Mould bacoma Ralaasad Araa 33: Plesang Rivar, Groeneberg and Rlat Rlviar. (4)
All data from tha short-livad Natalia Rapubllc. By tha 1870s, all Mara in tha
hands of spaculators, both company and individual, rather than producers.
African paopla on this land experienced a rapid transformation in their status,
onca colonial rula gava some meaning to tha notion of private property:
independent producers became tenants, paying cash as rant. (In some cases, a
labour requirement Mas attachedl if not fulfilled, rent was simply raised. (S))
From the mid-1660s, • African producers began to be displaced by Indian workers
Mho had completed their period of indenture, something foreseen and wholly
disliked by Llndlay and his Christian band at Inanda:
The great majority of these imported labourers
Mill never return to their native land... they are
indescribably wicked, and seam to ma hopelessly
lost now and foravar... I look upon these Indians
as a growing cloud on our social horizon. At
present there seams to be no friendly sympathy
between the coolies and the Natives... (6)
Provision for Indians wishing to settle on the land was extremely ad hoc, making
their entry into agriculture on their own account very different to that of
African producers. The first Indian producers were tenants, leasing small plots
on Oroaneberg and Riat Rlvler. (7) A common adjunct to farming activities was
hawking, or keeping small stores, catering particularly for trad* with Africans.
In a relatively ahort while, Indian producers were achieving great success. The
Inanda magistrate noted in 1876, 'but for them maize would be at famine price
and vegetables strangers to our table". (8) What gave them an edge over their
African counterparts was possibly differential access to credit (9) and
different rent charges: it seems as if Africans were charged per hut and Indians
per acre. Tha former could wall have been more restrictive. (10)
There were not many African landowners in the Inanda area outside of tha mission
glebe. The most Important was Dr J.L. Dube, who bought 200 acres of Plesang
River * henceforward known as Cuba's Farm - in 1901, for his self-help Christian
Industrial School, Ohlange. Just before the Land Act of 1913 put an end to
African purchases in 'white' South Africa, Isaiah Shembe also acquired a
portion of the old Plesang River in the name of the Amanazaretha. Ha called his
settlement Ekuphakameni, The Elevated Place, a country haven away from the evils
of town.
But it was those few African landowners interested in more secular pursuits Mho
were unsettled by the steady acquisition of land by Indians, untrammelled by
legislation such as tha Land Act. Some small plots Mere bought by tenant
producers, although the major purchases were due to reetrlcltve legislation
imposed on traders In town, which left land as on* of the few >vtnuti of
investment for Haalthtar Immigrants. In th» first three decadee of this
century, tha aaount of land OMnad by Indians lncraaaad steadily, as speculators
dlsposad of thalr holdings. (11) Indaadi even by tha turn of th* cantury, tha
Indian population of Inanda Has alzaabla enough to attract Mahataa Oandhl to
astabllsh his Phoenix Settlement there - again, on a portion of tha old Piesang
Rivar.
Fro* tha aarly 1930s, economic conditions and discriminatory legislation
conspired to cause agricultural stagnation in Inanda. Against the background
of deep receeeion, the 1936 Land Act declared Inanda a 'released area' - that
la, Isolated from 'Mhlte' South Africa for Incorporation Into the neighbouring
African reserve at some future date, once the state had acquired the necessary
land. The declaration of Released Area 33 can be seen aa a direct attach on
Indian owners and producers therel In that year, Indian people constituted
nearly 32% of the population of the Inanda Division, (12) a substantial
proportion of whom would' have resided In the releaaed area. Although there were
no Immediate changes to the pattern of land ownerahlp, further purchases by
Indiana ware nade extremely difficult. In the future, It would be African
landowners, entrepreneurs, churches and those attached to power atructuras in
the reserve who would buy land from Indian sellers. The state's sluggishness in
expanding the holdings of the Native Trust was marked all over the country and
Inanda was no exception. By 1969, for example, it had acquired only one piece
of Pleaang River farm. (13)
Alongside of these developments were the increasingly hostile proscriptions of
Indian people. The Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1V46
was the flrat piece of legislation to apply to rural as well as urban areas, and
Its effect waa 'a sharp decrease in the number of farms acquired by Indians'.
(14) Thereafter, the trend was towards intense subdivision of holdings and the
consequent decline of productivity and growth of population pressure. Despite
the bucolic air of H.I.E. Dhlomo'a 1947 poem about Inanda, where 'deer and
cattle mingle in the bushes,/ and ruatic song and mirth rouse midst the rushes',
(19) the agricultural prospect was growing bleaker. In the year before Dhlomo
wrote his poem, the Inanda Division contained the second largest number of
Indian people after Durban - 24 738 aa against 113 833. (16) Again, it is
Impossible to know exactly how many were living in Released Area 331 it la
known, however, that Plesang River, Groeneberg (notably, in an area known as
Matlkwe), and Rlet Rivler formed the southern limit of the largeat concentration
of Indian-owned farms in Natal, the northern limit being Cotton Lands, to the
west of Verulam. (17)
The 1990s were yeara of struggle to maintain footholds on the land, against
mounting odds. When the promise of greater security presented Itself In the
1960s, a decade of even greater squeeze on small producers with the beginnings
of monopolisation in Natal agriculture, (18) in the form of 'shack farming',
landowners willingly allowed human Battlements to grow on their properties. In
this way, tha urbanlaation of Inanda began.
The 1960s and 1970a
It was the clearance of another 'informal' settlement, Cato Manor, that gave a
spur to the process. Shanty towns had grown on Durban's peripheries since the
1930s, a product of the acute shortage of more substantial workers' housing and
the desire for greater freedom to ahape their own lives on the part of
residents. It la preciaely the tension between these two factors which,
according to Paul Maylam, has plagued local urban admlnlatrations over the
decades: a cheap, form of houalng, requiring little or no capital outlay, but
politically and socially uncontrollable. (19)
After numeroua civil disturbances in Cato Manor, the City Council finally
decided to opt for political control and to rehouse tenanta in the new townahip
of KwaMashu, begun in 1998. Situated to the north weat of the city, KwaMashu
ltaelf made • place Ilk* Inanda a viable option for daily or weekly commuting to
Mork in the city, sine* the bus service Mas extended in thia direction. Many
either did not qualify for, or refused, housing in th* toMnahlp - thay war*
among tha earliest of Inanda'a ahack dHallara. Othara triad KMaMaahu but found
it unpatatabla and moved on to Inanda. (20)
Thia outward invntnt, tha craatlon of a naw periphery, demonstrated tha rata of
Durban'a metropolitan dilation in a pariod of "rapid and unpracadantad axpanalon
in tha dacada 1963-73". (21)
Tha growth of Inanda changad Its social complexion complataly. For tha fax
'big' and aavaral hundrad 'snail' landowners, tananta brought a ataady Income.
Moreover, for thoaa landlords who wara alao ahopownera, tananta wara alao
c o m u n r i . Wharaaa before, thaaa had baan country concarna with modeat
turnovara, prof 1 tab la markata Mara now growing up around thai*.
Both African and Indian landlorda and tradara wara rapraaantad In this emerging
part-urban claas, and thair dual aourca of lncoaia waa to affact ralationa with
tenant-consumers profoundly. But tha claas waa divided, not only in terms of
seal*. Eapacially aftar tha Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959,
African patty bourgaoia intaraata bagan to make bida for a ahara in Inanda.
Balng a 'ralaaaad araa', thay basad thair claims on tha naad for African
advancement in African araaa. Soma, including A.W.O. Champion, a laadlng
ldaologua and actlva local Inanda raaidant, couchad thair class protectionism in
explicitly anti-Indian t i m :
Hara in Durban, whan tha Indiana wara vary
arrogant, tha Afrlcana took aticka to thaa> in
1949. Thay baat thaai up and Bade them cloae
thair shops. Yea, tha enrichment of Africans
froai atoraa and buaaa atartad in 1949, it
startad lika that... (22)
Not only bantuatan policy but also tha Group Areas Act affactad ralationa aaong
landlords. At laaat ona African landownar of vary long atanding haa had land in
surrounding areas axpropriatad on more than ona occasion for tha demarcation of
Indian Group Araaa. (23)
Unlika in tha African and Indian townahlpa naarby - tha huga council housing
scheae for Indian paopla, Phoenix, waa constructed in tha mid-1970s and tha naw
township of Ntuzuma Mas bagun in 1973 - no group of Interests asaociatad with
local bureaucracy haa arisen in Inanda. This ia because until 1979, no
authority in tha country waa willing to admit responsibility for it, and tha
ever more populous aettleaents there graw ovar two decades without any fora of
local administration. This situation haa given tha landlords - or ahacklorda,
as thay hava baan called, signifying thair powar ovar tha thousands of tenants
addad Importance, particularly thoaa who hava had dlract linka with tha
KwaZulu government and Inyanda, tha African tradara' aaaociatlon which
affiliatad to Inkatha in 1978. In this way, since thara haa baan no local
authority to do it, (24) attempts hava baan made to protect trading licences
againat competition - particularly aa tha licanaing authority la tha Varulam
maglatrat* and bacauaa of adminlatratlve rad tape, It haa baan easier for Indian
tradara to obtain licancaa. (29)
For many reasons - demographic, social, political, economic - moat tenants wara
to ba African paopla, dotting tha hillsides with their ahacka, or 'lmlJondolo',
lacking all baalc aarvlcaa and dependant on rivers and rain for their watar. A
aubatantial proportion of tha tenantry is made up of "people who have apent all
or moat of thair livaa in tha urban araa", (26) unable to find housing in tha
formal townahlpa, or aacaplng alngle-aax hostels to ba with family, or perhaps
evicted from another shanty aattlamant. A growing proportion muat ba coming
from rural areas, aa conditiona thara steadily daterlorata: "conditions In tha
bantuatana are ao poor that paopla are forced to go to urban araaa to aurviva".
(27)
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Schlemmer recently calculated that the overall increase In the number of
• in-formal' dual lings around Durban was 137% b*twaa.n 1966 and 19791 (28) clearly,
Inanda, as horn* of th* largest nuinbar, Mas subject to massive pressures with
auch a rapid growth rata in ao short a parlod. Availabls figures show tha
following lncraasa in Inanda'a population ovar tha past dacada:
1977 68 000
1979 88 000
1982 100 000 - 200-000
1989 290 000 (29)
As settlement haa become denser, so opportunltiss for growing maize or
vagatablas or keeping small stock hava diminished. In tha aarly 1980s,
danaitlaa of 100 to 230 paopla par hactara could ba found. (30) Household slza
now avaragaa 9.9 paopla, according to tha moat racant survey. Tha vast majority
of tenants are earn1-ak111 ed or unakllled Horkers, educational levela are low
(about six years of- schooling on average) and there is a sizeable
lumpenproletarlat - 19% is a recent estimate. (31)
Lavela of crime, especially against tha peraon - mugging, assault, rape, murder
- are high, and in this sense at least, Inanda is seriously under-policed, with
one small police station in upper Inanda. Whan it Is considered that
unemployment stands in the region of 43%, (32) a result of the severe economic
downswing beginning in the early 1980s, one haa a partial explanation for the
fragility which characterlaes social relations In Inanda. The degree of youth
unemployment ia particularly high, leading to the creation of a "bitter
generation' (33) amongst a tenantry caught in a downward apiral of poverty,
aggravated by Inflation and a burdensome general salea tax of 19% on all
commodities. In order to make ends meet, many have turned to the 'informal
sector', selling goods such as food and clothing, or to 'illegal' employment
(that Is, bypassing all official allocation channels), which Is very widespread
in Durban. (34)
In aome areas, tenanta cluster together for a specific purpose, such as religion
or relation to landlord. Some of the Indian tananta, numbering about 2 000
Individuals before the August violence, would fall In the latter category. The
most prominent of tha religious centres is that of tha Amanaxaretha, for aome
yeara wracked by division over a succession dispute. Other religious groupings
include the independent congregationallsts around their church in an area called
Afrika.
Apart from the collectivities with common linkages, one gains the Impression of
a generally fractured community, in which welfare and political organisations
have found it hard to mobilise support. 81 nee its formation In 1983, the United
Democratic Front (UDF) has had negligible presence in the area, and even Inkatha
haa not mustered noticeable support. This is another product of the lack of a
local authority around which support could cohere. in addition, the most
prominent African landlord,' Mr Rogers Ngcobo, fall out with the organisation in
the early 1980a.
Another form of fracture has been an 'ethnic* one, between Pondo and Zulu
p«njj». The former, a fairly large minority, hava congregated together in
shanty towns around Durban (being ineligible for townahip housing, which la
nearly all in KwaZulu). In Inanda, there are aeveral groups, In areas such aa
Piasang River and Bambayi.
Crises from 1979
The state haa alwaya regarded tenanta In 'informal' settlements as 'illegal
squatters', and therefore to be removed, since they have aettled without
official permlasion. As tha Inanda population swelled through the 1970s, so the
state took a more active interest In the area and acquired two further blocks of
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Plesang River (33) from Indian OHniri, whose properties now housed shanty
settlements. Before it took any further action, a series of local crlin,
beginning in 1979, brought tenant, landlord and state into a multilateral
conflict, Hhich sarvad merely to worsen relationships within Inanda.
The first of thasa Mas tha aevera drought which ravaged Natal from 1978. All
sources of water in Inanda dried up and through 1979, some shopkeepers began to
sail water, while others gave it away. One storeowner sank a borahola for
residents in tha immediate vicinity, with financial assistance from Indian
businessmen. The KwaZulu government had recently turned down his application
for Inanda to be connected to tha KwaMashu Hater supply. (36)
The Urban Foundation had bean investigating a bulk water supply too, and
calculated that Its Installation would cost about Rl.S all lion. (37) The
Department of Cooperation and Development (CAD) was unwilling to pursue the idea
- to lay on water would be to recognise the permanency of the tenants.
In early 1960, 30 people died of typhoid in Inanda. Official Intervention could
be delayed no longer, and an emergency committee was formed, consisting of the
Departments of Health and CAD, the South African Defence Force, tha Verulam
Magistrate (also tha local CAD commissioner) and the Urban Foundation. It
organised tankers to bring water to a number of points in Inanda. Only as a
result of this crisis did the Department of CAD assume responsibility for
Released Area 33.
Before Hater mains Hera finally laid in 1962, the state used tha health/water
issue as tha pretext for a series of removals. First Has a site-and-servlce
scheme, in association with the Urban Foundation. It was planned in five
weeks, and aimed at the residents of Amouti. Rumours there began to abound:
residents were being moved to make way for the expansion of Phoenix! Section 10
qualifications would be grantedi township houses would be built. Arrivals on
the scheme found pagged-out sites, each with a pit latrine, and one tap for
every four or so sites. They Here issued with tents until they could build
shacks, in turn an intermediate stage before they were able to construct more
substantial dwellings to minimum standards. When Newtown was proclaimed a
township in 1962, 23 000 people had moved there. A Surplus People Project
survey conducted among new arrivals showed that one of the main reasons for
leaving their old shacks was that 'tenants (had) found themselves subject to the
Hhims of the landlord*. (38)
Other kinds of removals followed. From early 1982, the state began to number
shacks, then prosecute tenants on Development (ex Native) Trust land, invoking
the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1991. Amidst considerable
differences of opinion at various levels of the Department of CAD hierarchy,
tenants' protest and a vigorous defence Hhich raised a myriad of technical
arguments, the state backed down on many such cases. (39)
In a second line of attack, and in apparent attempts both to deflect attention
away from the Department of CAD and to depolltlcise the issue of removals, the
Department of Health late in 1981 instructed several Indian landlords either to
provide Hater and sewerage services or to evict tenants. A huge proportion of
the Inanda tenantry was thus put at risk. No African landlords Here issued with
such ultimatums. For some months, the instructions were ignored, until in April
1962, random prosecutions began of groups of tenants, as Hell as of landlords,
under the 1936 Land Act. Under such pressure, some landlords began to issue
eviction orders and some called in officials to demolish shacks, actions Hhich
led to much bitterness:
the Indian landlords should bear in mind that
they have encouraged the squatters for a number
of years to build and improve the dwellings on
the said land. (40)
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%A few tried to withstand the pressure. On*, however, after on* conviction,
bOM*d partially .by allowing officials to demolish n*w shacks, saying at his
sacond trial that h* Mould "feel awkward" evicting established tanants. (41)
Indian landlords Mara bain? placad In a quit* untanabla position, for reasons
soon made claar. Slaultanaous with, tha first prosecutions Mas th* release of a
structure plan for the future of Inanda. It had been commissioned by the
Department of CAD and devised by a private Durban consultancy. It acknowledged
the logistical necessity of recognising the permanency of the Inanda population.
It recommended upgrading accommodation on a planned basis, in a series of
"neighbourhoods', Including some in Released Area 33 but also neM ones,
stretching Hell Into the less densely settled Inanda reserve. Judging by the
plan, Mhat Has being moated Mas a huge, 'do-it-yourself township for over half
a million people by the year 2000. It also recommended the incorporation of
Released Area 33 into KwaZulu as soon as possible. On the very last page of the
main report Mas the following advice:
land owned by non-blacks (i.e. non-Africans) in
Released Area 33 should be acquired as necessary
in accordance with the approved Implementation
proposals. (42)
Evictions, and resentment, continued through 1982, 1983, and 1984, In a climate
of Increasing uncertainty.
Indian tenants too began to feel Isolated and vulnerable. In March 1983, the
Durban City Council announced that those Inanda families who had applied for
housing in Phoenix could not be accommodated, because they Here living beyond
the Council's Jurisdiction. (43) Verulam Town Board declared that It had no
housing to offer, and In June, plans Here unveiled to rehouse all Indian
families in Roodekrans, a new townmhlp near Verulam, yet to be built. In the
face of protest, the Department of Community Development decided to undertake a
socio-economic survey of the Indian people of Inanda before taking further
action. (44)
Other events fed the general sense of tension and uncertainty through 1983 and
1984. There Mas a renewed outbreak of cholera In the first months of 1983 (five
people had died of the illness In the previous year) and problems over the
supply of Mater persisted. Also in 1983, there Has a prolonged boycott of
PUTCO buses (over fare Increases) occasionally flaring into violence between
drivers and commuters. (49) There Mere also Isolated Incidents of students'
protests - for example,* towards the end of 1983, police dispersed demonstrations
In the vicinity of Ohlange High School. (46)
At the end of the following year, Inanda's future seemed set along the course
platted by the structure plan, when the first Inanda townmhlp manager Has
appointed. (47) In January 1983, plaintive letters began appearing in the
Durban press:
Indian residents in inanda plead that the housing
authorities should give us alternative housing
immediately, before th* problem gets worse and
before It's too late for regrets. (48)
Some African landlords appeared to be Impatient at the rate of progess in
Inanda's conversion into a township. In July, a meeting Has held at which one
speaker called for a renewed effort to take over Indian lands and shops. Some
of those present were so disturbed at the tone that they reported the matter to
the Inanda police station. (49)
By this stage, the state and its agencies had discovered and forcibly widened
every faultline In the social makeup of Inanda.
The tvtntl of August 1983
"On Monday, August 9, a rolling school atrlke and
boycott began in Boat African townships to
protest tha assassination of Victoria Mxenge.
Schoolchildren, •specially In KwaMashu, Umlazi,
Clermont and Lamontvllle, startod marching (ro»
school to school, gathering more and nor* pupils,
until thousands of than were in the streets.' (SO)
Thar* Mara raasons why, all ovar tha country, African sacondary school studants
Mara in tha forafront of rasistanca to tha aparthald pollcias of tha atata. Not
only Mara thay raj act Ing an infarlor schooling but also "tha closing horizons of
thair futuras". (91) Tha addad adga in Durban Mas that, with tha important
axcaptiona of Lamontvllle and Chaatarvl 1 la, all township schools wara undar tha
control of tha KwaZulu govarnaant. In tha past, aa now, tha Hinistar of
Education, Dr 0. Dhlosjo (also secretary-general of Inkatha), was signalling his
govarnaant's determination to keep tha schools opan and 'running normally',
daspita tha boycott calls of tha atudants. Not only was thara a haightanad
idaological conflict hara - tha studants' organisation, tha Congrass of South
African Studants, was tha backbone of UDF support In tha townships - but an
ovarlay of ganarational conflict as wall, as youth came to ba idantlfiad with
tha UDF and adults with a more consarvatlva disposition and Inkatha. Ovar tha
waak baginnlng on tha Sth August, In all Durban's African townships studanta
c u t out on tha straat (attracting 'frlnga' elements whosa aotlvaa wara laaa
claar), attempting to assart thalr hegemony. Thay wara mat by vicious pollcs
action, followad by a countaractlonary thrust from Inkatha, which aaamad, in tha
biggar townships, to win back tha Initiative. Uhila thaaa battlas laft a trail
of daath, injury and arson in thair wake - shops and 'hata' aymbola such as
administrative officaa wara tha main targats - a mora explosive chain of events
was touched off In Inanda. For hara, two disturbed streams merged into an
uncontainad torrant. Tha first was of local origin, tha cumulative strife,
deprivation and uncertainty of an unorganised poori the second) tha highly
politicised revolt of tha youth.
On Monday night, August Sth, ona group of youths surrounded the house of a
policeman in Ntuzuaa. He opened fire, killing one of their number. The
following morning, the 'rolling strike', now enraged, reached Inanda. Police
dispersed the marchers with tear gas and bullets, but as thay scattered, they
lost all control of the situation. What can be described as 'lumpen' youth from
Inanda took up and led where tha studanta had left off. (92) At midday, two
Indian-owned ahopa and houses were looted and burnt. One of these belonged to
one of the most prominent landowners, Mr Laljeeth Rattan. He managed to remove
his family before the attack. Police Intervened to disperse looters but a crowd
regrouped on the main road, where roadblocka were set up and cara and buses
stoned. By late afternoon, hundreds of Indian people, having taken fright, had
been turned into refugees. They congregated In the Oreenbury Hall, Phoenix,
(93) where a wrangle began to 'claim' them, Involving the House of Delegates
and state-sponsored civil defence groups on the one side and more popular
housing action groups on tha other.
The same pattern - of looting and burning Indian-owned propertlea, and stoning
vehicles on the main road - continued throughout Wednesday and for mont of
Thursday, on which day one driver was killed and another Injured as a result of
the stoning. The Indian refugees felt that the police had been of little
assistance. The latter in fact seem to have been very thin on the ground,
concentrating their attempts on keeping the road clear. At scenea of looting,
their response seems to have been very much of a 'hit and run' type: firing on
crowds, making arrests and moving off again. (94) Medical evidence confirmed
eyewitness accounts that up to Thursday, it waa mostly people in their teenn and
early twenties Involved in arson, and that police were inflicting the
casualties, being bullet wounds. O S )
On* account o-f the unrest in Inanda tells am much about domestic relations and
unexpected opportunities as it does of the attack Itself. It naa gathered by
Prof. Fatima Meer not Many days after the events described:
We spoke to Beatrice, Mho has taken over the
Oovender house - six very dark rooms with a
verandah. She had rented a roosi from the* for
the last fifteen years. That she had been close to
the* Mas reflected in her distinctly Indian-accented
English. She said she Mas a neither of Inkatha.
•When they caae to attack, I hid the Indiana and I
told then that this Mas ay house*. After the nob
left, the Indians took Mhat they could carry and
went away. She says she Mill buy the house now
because the Oovenders Mill not C O B * back. (9a)
Late on Thursday afternoon, the character of attacks began to change. Firstly,
increasing numbers of adults became caught up in the looting and burning of
shops and houses. Secondly, stab and assault Mounds Mere inflicted for the
first tine. The latter Mas indicative of a new element In all the African areas
of the city: vigilante 'lapis' (armed contingenta) wielding spears, sticks,
knobkerrles and the like and acting in the m a t of Inkatha. Fro* Thursday
night, lapis Mere being deployed widely, dispersing youths and searching for
stolen goods. In Inanda, their entry caused the violence to spin off in a new
direction, as became clear on Friday afternoon.
Meanwhile, as refugees crowded into the hall in Phoenix, panic spread throughout
the estate, particularly in those units bordering on Inanda. As rumours spread
of a 'repeat of 1949', n n began to arm themselves and fora into vigilante
groups. (37) The Natal Indian Congress, senior organisation in the Natal UDF
and for IS aonths campaigning for the withdrawal of police and army from the
townships, found itself in the awkward position of calling upon these sane
personnel for protection, and a limited army patrol was despatched to Phoenix.
Events reached their pitch in Inanda on Friday, 9th August. Incidents of
incendiarism (including the setting alight of sugar cane on the fringes of
Inanda) and stone-throwing continued, but the focus was on the area surrounding
the Mahatma Gandhi Settlement. Both on the Phoenix and Inanda aides, armed
crowds massed early in the morning. A small army contingent made feeble
attempts to disperse the opposing factions, then withdrew. The Inanda crowd,
estimated at about 300, charged into the Settlement and set numerous buildings
alight. The Indian crowd, calling Itself The Phoenix Boys, Joined the fray. A
group of refugees, left homeless after another township conflict, (98) Mas
caught in the middle. Mewa Ramgobln, a prominent NIC and UDF leader and then
standing trial for treason, nearly loat his life at the hands of The Phoenix
Boys as he tried to remonstrate with them. In all the violence, Gandhi's home
•Savordaya' and the school which bore his wife's name, Kasturbai Gandhi, Mere
destroyed.
The tragic symbolism of the burning of the Gandhi Settlement went far beyond the
Inmediate act of the violent destruction of a 'place of peace'. It signified
also the void of political organisation and ideas, on all sides of the Group
Areas divide, which could have allayed, or at least toned down, the
confrontations. One of the Hambanathi refugees Mas left to reflect, "It Is a
great pity. These people are uneducated and do not know what they are doing".
(59) The other symbolism Mas that an area where some measure of Indian and
African co-residence, if fraught in some of its aspects, had continued for more
than a century, and the last of any significance in the country, had been torn
apart.
As the sides Mere withdrawing on late Friday morning, a large lmpi from a nearby
shanty town, Lindelanl, arrived on the scene. It made repeated attacks on
Friday and Saturday. They Mere repulsed, but there Mere a number of deaths.
-3-
Th* *ff*ct of this development Has to turn th* Xnanda shanty tOHO against th*
Llndvlani on* (whether aa part of B O M competition for dominane* on th* part of
landlords la unclear) and to turn many against Inkatha.
By Saturday, th*r* Mara 2 000 refugees in Phoenix, Mhila in Inanda laolatad
incidents continued. Armed vigilantes patrol lad th* Phoanlx aid* of th* bord*r
and th* atmosphere along It remained tans*. On Sunday, Inkatha h*ld a 'p*ac*
rally' n*ar to th* shall of th* Gandhi Settlement, to signal r*ass*rtlon of its
position in th* townships. In addition, announced Dr Dhlomo,
M * hav* coat h*r* to riauuri our Indian brothers
and slst*rs of Inkatha's willingness to co-operate
Mith them in all efforts that are aimed at
restoring p*ac*v law and order in the area* (60)
S O B * Indian shopkeepers declared that unless they had a first guarantee front th*
KwaZulu government that they would be secure after incorporation, they Mould
not rebuild their premises. Soae, however, did venture back - those whose only
livelihood and investments had been thir land and their buildings. "My house and
farm is worth a lot of money, therefore I decided to return to Inanda*, said
one. (al) After the violence, even lower compensations Here being offered to
them. (62) And atter long, drawn out disputes with authorities, th* Indian
tenants have been rehoused in Phoenix and verulam. (63)
At the end of the Meek of violence, 42 Indian-owned shops and businesses, as
many houses and three surgeries operated by an Indian doctor, had been
destroyed. The only Indian shops left Intact Here in upper Inanda, n»ar the
police station, and in the Mat Ikwe area.
The last Incident of violence, identifiable as part of the August upsurge, cam*
exactly a week after it had begun. On Tuesday, 13th August, the bodies of three
Indian men Mere found burnt on th* Phoenix-Inanda border. They were all from
the same family: a father, his son and his brother-in-law. The father had fled
his house in Inanda a f*H days before. (64)
In September, renewed clashes occurred In African townships ae Inkatha impis
searched out auapected or known UDF aupporters and threatened scholars. Inanda
escaped this violence, but the more basic economic insecurity persisted. At th*
beginning of September, clashes over access to water assumed an 'ethnic'
dimension. People from Plesang River, allegedly Xhosa speaking, had been uaing
the taps in Newtown (all Zulu speaking). Th* occupants of Newtown barred them
from th* privilege and the shanty dwellers retaliated by preventing buseo from
entering Newtown. Talks between the leaders of the opposing partlea, arranged
by members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, averted fresh violence, but the
conflict still simmers, with Llndelani people alao becoming involvwd In
'antl-Pondo' actions. (69)
In late September 1983, the state released its consolidation proposals for
KwaZulu. As if to underline its continuing commitment to divisive policies and
strategies, its recommendation for the Inanda region was that three more farms
to the north of Released Area 33 - Groeneberg, Buffelsdraai and the original
Inanda, all housing stable Indian communities, be Incorporated into KwnZulu.
(66)
Responses to the August 1983 violence in Inanda
While none of the political organisations directly concerned with the violence
in Durban had any measurable presence In Inanda, what happened there was
critical for all of then. Th* NIC and UDF condemned th* violence as th* work of
"mobs of criminals looting and burning indiscriminately", while Chief Buthelezl
of Inkatha blamed the general malaise on students, the UDF and th* ANC, and held
that there was "no anti-Indian sentiment Involved in th* attacks againat Indian
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homes and shops', but added that there Ham "a lot of resentment" that some
Indians had participated in the n m trlcaaeral parliament. Smaller parties,
such as those connected to the House of Delegates, also blasted students and the
UDF for the violence. Y.8. Chlnsamy of the Reform Party believed that it had
not been racially motivated, citing as evidence that no Indian people had been
assaulted or killed, and that they had been able to leave before the looting of
their properties began. (67)
Generally, Inanda Has perceived as suffering an overspill of the violence from
its epicentres in nearby African townships) there Has nothing particular or
distinct about it at all. One exception to this view Has Ela Ramgobln, a social
worker In Inanda, NIC executive member and grand-daughter of Gandhi, Mho placed
the responsibility for the events on the state: 'One has to look at the history
of Inanda to put it in perspective. People in that area have been asking for
help for years...* (68)
The explanation for Vie more general political response is that all these
organisations, in different Hays, Mere locked lmto a political discourse the
primary categories of Mhlch Here racial ones. In the moment of crisis, it nould
have been Inconceivable to admit to any form Hhatsoever of 'racial hostility',
since the implications in the Natal region Mould have been deeply damaging to
them, albeit for very different reasons in each case. In line Mith the UDF's
vision of a nonracial and democratic future, stripped of all legally-enforced
segregation, Inanda had been held up as an example of hoH Indian and African
people could live in harmony. For Inkatha, appeasing racial fears and
promising the ability to restore calm and to offer security Mould earn
credibility among Indian people In Natal and cement alliances tilth reformist
groupings against common political foes. In turn, such an option Hould appeal
to the parties in the niH Indian House. It Mould confirm their position that
the Hay to ensure racial harmony Has by the separate representation of minority
rights.
None Has able to go beyond 'African-Indian' relations, to examine Instead
relations of Health and poverty and hon race had been hitched to vested interest
over many years in a place such as Inanda. For the 'Inanda mobs' could not be
excused as criminals and hooligans, however obnoxious their behaviour had been.
They Mere local people experiencing ever increasing degrees of poverty and
deprivation and who had Identified symbols of Health and Hell-being (most
certainly without the assistance of the police, as one African landowner had
alleged) on the other side of a great divide. Coupled to this was the climate
of insecurity engendered by the actions of the state. Two faultllnes had
Intersected, and the structure gave May.
There Has an identifiable pattern to the violence - It had a set of 'rules' and
a purpose, "the use of force being proportionate to that purpose". (49) That
no Indian people Mere hurt or killed on their premises - though when they left
In cars and trucks they had stones throMn at them - may perhaps have been good
fortune. That nearly all of them left as soon as they could might also have
minimised the possibility of injury (though Fattma Meer believed that their
departure left their properties completely open to attack(70)). But more likely
Has the fact that the violence Has not the result of any provocative of
aggressive action on their part, which might have been Interpreted as hostility
toward* the personal integrity of one of another race. The causes Mere
altogether different. In this sense at least, one cannot talk of 'race riots',
since racial differences themselves did not constitute the cause for conflict.
(71)
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Conclusion: A repeat of 1949?
*A repeat of 1949" m i a sentiment carried in the local madia and felt in •on*
quarters in 1989. Reading Webster's anatomy of th* 1949 violence, (72) on* can
find tout uncomfortable similarities: competition for trading preserves,
expressed in racial form friction between landlords and tenants in shanty
townsi th* ambivalent position of Indian* in the South African political or<l*rl
ths lack of synchronisation betMeen leadership and ground floor levels In
popular political organisations. Then, as non, Africans had to carry passes and
could not proceed beyond a certain level of skill In the workplace, and urban
experiences of Indian and African people differed in several respects.
One must not be persuaded by the similarities. There Here differences, too,
most notably perhaps in the "rules of violence' on the two occasions. Yet when
the events of 1949 and 1983 are put Into their broader context and approached
historically, it becomes clear that superficial comparisons are of little use.
In 1949, the Nationalist government was newl there was no Group Areas Act and
therefore no Phoenix or Chatsworthl there was no bantustan policy and no
Inkathal there was no centralised urban policy towards Africans and no Umlazi
and KwaMashul there was no Inanda. The conflict in 1949 provided the state with
justification to push ahead with its radical policies of segregation. The
conflict of 1989 is an end product of that process.
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